Corgi’s 1:72 scale German Messerschmitt Me 262A-1A Fighter – Leutnant Walter Hagenah, “Yellow 17”, Jagdgeschwader 3 “Udet”, Germany, 1945
One of the most advanced WWII combat aircraft, the Me 262 operated as a light bomber, reconnaissance, and experimental night fighter. The Me 262 proved an effective dogfighter against Allied fighters; German pilots claimed 542 Allied aircraft shot down, although higher claims have sometimes been made. The aircraft had reliability problems because of strategic materials shortages and design compromises with its Junkers Jumo 004 axial-flow turbojet engines. Late-war Allied attacks on fuel supplies also reduced the aircraft’s effectiveness. Armament production within Germany was focused on more easily manufactured aircraft. Ultimately, the Me 262 had little effect on the war because of its late introduction and the small numbers that entered service.
While still in its nascent stage, direct interference from senior military commanders severely restricted the effectiveness of the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet, as they procrastinated about whether it should be used as a fighter, or a bomber. Luftwaffe pilot Franz Gapp perfectly illustrated this problem – a highly decorated bomber pilot, who flew more than 400 missions, mainly in the Ju-88 fighter-bomber, Gapp transferred to an Me 262 attack unit, where it was hoped the speed of the new jet would see significant strategic bombing successes.
One of the most interesting engagements involving a Messerschmitt Me 262 jet fighter during WWII occurred on April 10th, 1945, when pilot Lt Walther Hagenah and his wingman were ordered to intercept a heavy raid of USAAF bombers attacking an area north of Berlin. Knowing they would be massively outnumbered by Allied aircraft, the pair intended to attack the formation at high speed, using cannon and their underwing mounted R4M unguided rocket projectiles to break up the formation and spread confusion.
With the mighty bomber stream in sight, Hagenah noticed a flight of six American P-51D Mustangs above them, which immediately dropped their external fuel tanks as they dived in to attack. Hagenah’s experience told him that if he turned to face them, or made any violent evasive maneuver, the speed of the Mustangs would soon bring him into their gunsights, so instead, he pushed the throttles to full power and began a gentle dive towards the ground, but crucially, not changing heading.
His wingman decided to take a different course of action, turning to face the Mustangs and immediately being enveloped in a hail of .50 calibre bullets. With his own jet now at full speed, Hagenah expertly positioned his Messerschmitt for an attack on the American fighters, opening up on them with everything he had, including ripple-firing his R4M rockets at the enemy fighter formation. In his memoirs, he later recalled how two of the Mustangs were hit by rockets and immediately fell out of the sky, but having made his defiant gesture, he now needed to find the nearest Luftwaffe airfield, as he was dangerously low on fuel. Unfortunately, the airfield at Larz was under attack by swarms of strafing USAAF fighters, but with his fuel situation now critical, he had no option but to land the jet with American fighters still in the overhead.
Combat record keeping at this stage of the war has proved notoriously difficult to corroborate historically, particularly when it came to those submitted by Luftwaffe pilots and despite the availability of Hagenah’s personal recollection in this case, he would only be credited with a single Mustang victory during this engagement. Corresponding USAAF records did little to help corroborate his claims, even though reports filed from the American bombers they were ordered to attack did confirm the presence of rocket carrying Messerschmitt Me 262 jets on the day in question.
In fact, even the individual aircraft Hagenah used for this sortie cannot be definitively corroborated, however ‘Yellow 17’ was one of the jets on the airfield that day and was also one of the machines equipped with the R4M rocket projectiles. One of the most unusual combat engagements of the Second World War, it is thought that this was the only time a USAAF fighter was brought down during an operational sortie using an unguided rocket projectile fired from a Messerschmitt Me 262 jet. If Lt. Hagenah’s account is to be believed, the April 10th,1945, encounter witnessed a truly unique combat engagement in the skies above Berlin.
Forces of Valor’s 1:72 scale US Boeing AH-64D Apache Longbow Attack Helicopter – 1-227 ATKHB, 11th Aviation Regiment (Attack), 1st Cavalry Division, Karbala, Iraq, March 2003
An attack helicopter is an armed helicopter with the primary role of an attack aircraft, with the offensive capability of engaging ground targets such as enemy infantry, military vehicles and fortifications. Due to their heavy armament they are sometimes called helicopter gunships.
Attack helicopters can use weapons including auto cannons, machine guns, rockets, and anti-tank missiles such as the AGN-114 Hellfire. Some attack helicopters are also capable of carrying air-to-air missiles, though mostly for purposes of self-defense against other helicopters and low-flying light combat aircraft.
The Boeing AH-64 Apache is an American twin-turboshaft attack helicopter with a tail wheel-type landing gear arrangement and a tandem cockpit for a crew of two. It features a nose-mounted sensor suite for target acquisition and night vision systems. It is armed with a 30mm (1.18in) M230 chan gun carried between the main landing gear, under the aircraft’s forward fuselage, and four hard points mounted on stub-wing pylons for carrying armament and stores, typically a mixture of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles and Hydro 70 rocket pods. The AH-64 has significant systems redundancy to improve combat survivability.
A modern attack helicopter has two primary roles: first, to provide direct and accurate close air support for ground troops; and second, the anti-tank role to destroy grouped enemy armor. Attack helicopters are also used as protective escort for transport helicopters, or to supplement lighter helicopters in the armed reconnaissance roles. In combat, an attack helicopter is projected to destroy targets worth around 17 times its own production cost before being destroyed.
The Apache began as the Model 77 developed by Hughes Helicopters for the United States Army’s Advanced Attack Helicopter program to replace the AH-1 Cobra. The prototype YAH-64 was first flown on 30 September 1975. The U.S. Army selected the YAH-64 over the Bell YAH-63 in 1976, and later approved full production in 1982. After acquiring Hughes Helicopters in 1984, McDonnell Douglas continued AH-64 production and development. The helicopter was introduced to U.S. Army service in April 1986. The advanced AH-64D Apache Longbow was delivered to the Army in March 1997. Production has been continued by Boeing Defense, Space & Security, with over 2,400 AH-64s being produced by 2020.
The U.S. Army is the primary operator of the AH-64. It has also become the primary attack helicopter of multiple nations, including Greece, Japan, Israel, the Netherlands, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. It has been built under license in the United Kingdom as the AgustaWestland Apache. American AH-64s have served in conflicts in Panama, the Persian Gulf Kosovo Afghanistan, and Iraq. Israel used the Apache in its military conflicts in Lebanon and the Gaz Strip. British and Dutch Apaches have seen deployments in wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The AH-64D Apache Longbow is equipped with a glass cockpit and advanced sensors, the most noticeable of which being the AN/APG-78 Longbow millimeter-wave fire-control radar (FCR) target acquisition system and the Radar Frequency Interferometer (RFI), housed in a dome located above the main rotor. The radome’s raised position enables target detection while the helicopter is behind obstacles (e.g. terrain, trees or buildings). The AN/APG-78 is capable of simultaneously tracking up to 128 targets and engaging up to 16 at once; an attack can be initiated within 30 seconds. A radio modem integrated with the sensor suite allows data to be shared with ground units and other Apaches, allowing them to fire on targets detected by a single helicopter.
The aircraft is powered by a pair of up-rated T700-GE-701C engines. The forward fuselage was expanded to accommodate new systems to improve survivability, navigation, and ‘tactical internet’ communications capabilities. In February 2003, the first Block II Apache was delivered to the U.S. Army, featuring digital communications upgrades. The Japanese Apache AH-64DJP variant is based on the AH-64D; it can be equipped with the AIM-92 Stinger air-to-air missiles for self-defense.
Forces of Valor’s upcoming pair of 1:72 scale AH-64D Apache attack helicopters are currently on the docket for an October release. Pre-orders are still being accepted.
Panzerkampf’s 1:72 scale Russian Pantsir-S1 Self-Propelled Air Defense System – Russian Arctic Defense Forces, Winter Camouflage
Russia has been quietly investing in Arctic military and industrial infrastructure for the last decade. Russia’s expanded Arctic presence is part of President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to elevate Russia’s position on the world stage. The current age has seen relatively low-tension in the region, but this may be coming to an end. Russia has reopened Soviet military bases and expanded the navy’s Northern Fleet. Russia seeks to increase its military power in the Arctic to enhance homeland defense and secure Russia’s economic future by attracting international investment.
Melting sea ice intensifies competition in the Arctic. Climate change is increasing accessibility to the Northern Sea Route. Increased Arctic traffic heightens the potential for competition around physical access and resources. Moscow views securitizing the region through military activity as a prerequisite for controlling its interests in the rapidly changing Arctic. Russia has encouraged energy companies to increase exploration activities in the Arctic to reap the economic benefits of reserves being uncovered by melting Arctic ice.
Russia sees its assertive military posture as a response to NATO’s presence in the region, as several NATO members hold territory in the Arctic. Former NATO commander Adm. James Stavridis acknowledges that the Arctic is a “zone of competition” that has the potential to devolve into a “zone of conflict.” Russia’s militarization of the Arctic has pushed Arctic and NATO countries to call for the preservation of the Arctic as a ‘low tension’ area. Growing tensions with the West risks miscommunication that could lead to conflict or an even more assertive Russian military posture in the Arctic.
53% of the Arctic coastline belongs to Russia. Its Arctic military bases are concentrated mostly around Murmansk Oblast, but in recent years Russia has expanded capabilities in the High North. Russia has taken full advantage of its arctic territory. Wrangel Island, Cape Schmidt, and Kotelny Island developments are right across the Bering Strait from Alaska. Visualizing Russia’s Arctic presence shows the density of Russia’s military infrastructure in the region. (Courtesy: ASP)
Looking to defend their strategic interests, the Pantsir (Russian: “Carapace”) missile system is a family of self-propelled, medium-range surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems. Starting with the Pantsir-S1 (NATO reporting name SA-22 Greyhound) as the first version, it is produced by KBP Instrument Design Bureau of Tula, Russia.
Great emblem of the Northern Fleet of the Russian Armed ForcesGreat emblem of the Russian Space Forces
The Pantsir-S1 was designed to provide point air defense of military, industrial and administrative installations against aircraft, helicopters, precision munitions, cruise missiles and UAVs; and to provide additional protection to air defense units against enemy air attacks employing precision munitions, especially at low to extremely low altitudes.
Panzerkampf’s 1:72 scale Russian Pantsir-S1 Self-Propelled Air Defense System – Russian Aerospace Defense Forces, Woodlands Camouflage
Panzerkampf’s latest iteration of the Pantsir-S1 self-propelled air defense system, along with a tr-colored camouflaged version, to trundle up to the North Pole this September.
Having seen the introduction of advanced monoplane fighter designs in both the German and Japanese air forces, America was only too aware that their own Air Force was in need of upgrade as a matter of urgency. To this end, an official requirement was issued in February 1937 for the production of a new pursuit fighter, an aircraft which would have to possess performance which had never previously been seen, not only on an American aircraft, but anywhere else in the world. The Lockheed Aircraft Company were one of six companies determined to satisfy this demanding requirement and entrusted the design of this radical new aircraft to talented designer Clarence ‘Kelly’ Johnson, who was basically given a free rein during its development. Almost immediately, he determined that a single engined aircraft could not satisfy these demanding specifications and started work on a twin engined design, one which featured twin booms to house the engines and superchargers, with a centrally positioned nacelle for the cockpit and the fighter’s heavy armament.
The new aircraft looked incredible and was a radical departure from any fighter aircraft design that had gone before it, with Lockheed being awarded a contract to produce a prototype example. The XP38 was a thing of beauty and after just a short 38 minute maiden flight, everyone at Lockheed knew they had a winner on their hands. In fact, officials were so impressed with the aircraft’s performance that they immediately decided to make an attempt on the US Transcontinental speed record to highlight its potential, an attempt which saw the XP38 shatter the existing record by an impressive 23 minutes. Unfortunately, it appears that officials at the destination airport were not expecting the arrival of the strange new fighter and kept it holding so long that it actually ran out of fuel and had to make an emergency landing on a local golf course. Nevertheless, the aircraft had shown its potential and the US Army Air Force ordered sixty-six aircraft and America had their first 400 mph fighter.
The introduction of the P-38 Lightning was not without its problems, however, this was not surprising bearing in mind its performance and configuration were so radically different to anything which had gone before it. Almost constant development would see the Lightning develop into a devastatingly effective high altitude interceptor and with engines which both drove outwardly rotating propellors, also eventually proved to be an incredibly stable aircraft. Possessing impressive range and firepower, the Lightning would eventually be used to avenge the Pearl Harbor attack, when sixteen P-38s of the 339th Fighter Squadron intercepted a bomber carrying Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the mastermind of that infamous raid, and shot it down. The P-38 Lightning would go on to serve with distinction in both the Pacific and European theatres, one of the most capable and distinctive aircraft of the Second World War.
For US fighter pilot Charles Henry ‘Mac’ MacDonald, the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on 7th December 1941 left him with a determination to do his duty in ensuring this disastrous day for America would only result in their eventual victory. Joining the USAAF and gaining his wings in May 1939, he would first be assigned to the 55th Pursuit Group and then on to the 18th Pursuit Group at Wheeler Field, Hawaii in early 1941 and was still there at the time of the Japanese surprize attack, arguably the darkest day in American military history. His continued service would see him gaining ever more responsibility and new postings, first back home in the US to train new pilots, then on to the savage fighting of the Pacific War. By October 1943, he had attained the rank of Major and was posted as the Executive Officer of the 475th Fighter Group’s ‘Satan’s Angels’, flying P-38 Lightnings out of Dobodura, New Guinea, where his reputation as a fighter ace and effective leader of men would soon be forged. Often asking his men to fly dangerous long range missions in their Lightnings over vast expanses of ocean, MacDonald, would often be the first aircraft into the air, leading from the from and inspiring his pilots to make their mark on the war.
Eventually attaining the rank of Colonel, MacDonald became the Commanding Officer of the 475th Fighter Group and during this time, would welcome the arrival of a rather famous civilian advisor to the unit, long range aviator and US national hero Charles Lindbergh, who was cleared to fly with the unit. During his time in the Pacific, Lindbergh would help the 475th unlock the awesome potential of the P-38, using his knowledge of long range engine management to alter the power and fuel settings of their aircraft, modifications which extended the range of the Lightning by an incredible 100%. Now, ‘Colonel Mac’ and the pilots of the 475th could provide fighter cover for bombers attacking the Japanese oil refineries at Balikpapan in Borneo, with flight times of between twelve and fourteen hours needing to be flown. This raid was pivotal in turning the tide of the Pacific War and preparing American forces for the final push towards the Japanese home islands.
Colonel ‘Mac’ Macdonald would end the war with 27 aerial victories, with several others either damaged or probably destroyed, making him the third most successful fighter ace in the Pacific Theatre. All victories were scored using the Lockheed P-38 Lightning and whilst he would use several different machines, they were all named ‘PUTT… PUTT… MARU’. It is not known for sure what this name refers to, but it is thought that it could be a reference to the Japanese supply barges the unit were often sent to destroy, vessels which were referred to as Marus, with their rather agricultural engines making a putt putt chugging sound. Whatever the case, if they were in the sights of a 475th Fighter Group P-38 Lightning, they were on borrowed time.
Putt Putt Maru is expected to land later in September.
Hobby Master’s 1:48 scale Imperial Japanese Navy Mitsubishi A6M2 “Zero” Type 21 Fighter – PO Testsuzo Iwamoto, IJN Aircraft Carrier Zuikaku, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 1941
The “Winds Code“ is a confused military intelligence episode relating to the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, especially the advance knowledge debate claiming that the attack was expected.
The Winds Code was an instruction from Tokyo to Japanese legations worldwide that diplomatic relations were in danger of being ruptured. While the code was set up, the problem is whether the code was ever transmitted or not. Amid all the other indicators of approaching conflict, it seems likely that the message was never sent, or at least never recorded at a high level in the US command structure.
In any case a code message in a news or weather programs was not needed, as ordinary commercial communication facilities were available to Japan right up to the December 7th attack. Pearl Harbor historians Gordon Prange and Roberta Wholstetter sidestep the issue by saying that the intercepted codes-destruct messages of December 2nd were a more accurate indication of war breaking out. Both Henry Clausen and John Costello see the Winds Code controversy as a red herring and coming close to disinformation (Clausen) or only as an alert to legations (Costello).
The code was set up, so that in case of an emergency leading to the interruption of regular communication channels, a coded message would be inserted into the daily Japanese international news broadcast. Concealed within the meteorological reports, and repeated twice, would be “East wind rain” (“Higashi no kaze ame“), “West wind clear” (“Nishi no kaze hare“) or “North wind cloudy” (“Kitano kaze kumori“), the first indicating an imminent major breach with the United States, the second a break with the British (including the invasion of Thailand); the third indicating a break with the Soviet Union. Presumably if sent both the first and second messages would have been sent, the third referring to the Soviet Union would not have been applicable in 1941.
The signal setting up the code was intercepted and broken by USN cryptographer Commander Laurance Safford at OP-20-G in Washington. Consequently, a close monitoring of the Japanese daily shortwave broadcasts was instituted for the codes, dubbed the Winds Code by the Americans.
USN Chief Warrant Officer Ralph T. Briggs, an operator at Station M, the Navy’s East Coast intercept installation at Cheltenham in Maryland, stated he logged “Higashi no kaze ame” (“East wind rain”) on the morning of December 4; this was transmitted to the Fleet Intelligence Office at Pearl through the secure TWX line. Briggs was subsequently given a four-day pass as a reward (and was away in Cleveland on the 7th). At the FIO, Commander Laurance Safford states he reported this message to his superiors in Washington. At this point there is no further record of the message. Some eight other Army and Navy officers testified that they, too, had seen a winds execute message. But two of the men completely reversed their original testimony and the others turned out to have only vague recollections.
None of the official inquiries took Safford’s statement as fact; the most generous reporting that he was “misled” and that his memory was faulty. His case was not helped by his uncertainty over the date, although Lt Alwin Kramer also agreed in 1944 that he had seen Safford’s yellow teletype sheet.
Hobby Master’s 1:48 scale Imperial Japanese Navy Mitsubishi A6M2 “Zero” Type 21 Fighter – PO First Class Tsugio Matsuyama, IJN Aircraft Carrier Hiryu, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 1941
It has been claimed that in the week after the attack there was significant document ‘loss’ at the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington. In 2008 historians from the National Security Agency went back and analyzed all American and foreign intelligence sources and decrypted cables. They came to the conclusion that “winds execute” message never reached Washington. If there was a message then the blame would fall on the military for not passing it on.
Following the end of the war, Japanese officials advised General MacArthur that no Winds signal was ever sent relating to the United States. This is supported by the testimony of Commander Joseph Rochefort (based in Naval HQ in Pearl Harbor). However an American intelligence team in Japan led by Colonel Abraham Sinkov of Central Bureau in September and October 1945 found they were told “half-truths or outright lies” by Japanese intelligence specialists, partly as there were rumors that the Americans would execute those involved in intelligence. The team was not allowed to reveal American intelligence successes. However some Japanese (Arisue and Nishimura) were more forthcoming when they saw that the Americans were interested in Japanese help against the Soviets.
The coded Winds message was reported from Hong Kong, late on Sunday, December 7th, local time. The signal was “higashi no kaze, ame; nishi no kaze, hare” (“Easterly wind, rain; Westerly wind, fine”); meaning that Japan was about to declare war on Britain and America (and attacked British Malaya before Hawaii). A skeleton staff had been left behind in Hong Kong when the British Far East Combined Bureau (FECB) moved to Singapore in August 1939.
Hobby Master’s 1:48 scale take on the illustrious Mitsubishi Zero is one of their best selling models to date, time and again selling out within weeks of their release. Two new Zeros are scheduled to take to the skies this October, and will no doubt sell out just as quickly as their predecessors. Make sure to pre-order one or both today!
Hobby Master’s 1:72 scale USAF Boeing F-15E Strike Eagle Multi-Role Fighter – 71-0291, McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company, St. Louis, Missouri, 1980
The McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) F-15E Strike Eagle is an American all-weather multirole strike fighter derived from the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle. The F-15E was designed in the 1980s for long-range, high-speed interdiction without relying on escort or electronic-warfare aircraft. United States Air Force (USAF) F-15E Strike Eagles can be generally distinguished from other US Eagle variants by darker aircraft camouflage, conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) mounted along the engine intake ramps (although CFTs can also be mounted on earlier F-15 variants) and a tandem-seat cockpit.
The Strike Eagle has been deployed for military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Libya, among others. During these operations, the strike fighter has carried out deep strikes against high-value targets and combat air patrols, and provided close air support for coalition troops. It has also been exported to several countries.
The McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle was introduced by the USAF to replace its fleet of McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom IIs. Unlike the F-4, the F-15 was designed for the air superiority mission with little consideration for a ground-attack role; the F-15 Special Project Office opposed the idea of F-15s performing the interdiction mission, giving rise to the phrase “Not a pound for air to ground.” In service, the F-15 has been a successful fighter, scoring over 100 aerial combat victories and zero losses in air-to-air combat as of 2007.
Despite a lack of official interest, McDonnell Douglas quietly worked on an F-15-derived interdictor fighter. The company envisaged the aircraft as a replacement for the General Dynamics F-111 and the remaining F-4s, as well as to augment the existing F-15s. In 1978, the USAF initiated the Tactical All-Weather Requirement Study, which looked at McDonnell Douglas’s proposal and other options such as the purchase of further F-111Fs. The study recommended the F-15E as the USAF’s future strike platform, In 1979, McDonnell Douglas and Hughes began a close collaboration on the development of the F-15E’s air-to-ground capabilities.
To assist in the F-15E’s development, McDonnell Douglas modified the second TF-15A prototype, AF serial number71-0291, as a demonstrator. The aircraft, known as the Advanced Fighter Capability Demonstrator, first flew on 8 July 1980. It was previously used to test conformal fuel tanks (CFTs), initially designed for the F-15 under the designation “FAST Pack”, with FAST standing for “Fuel and Sensor, Tactical. It was subsequently fitted with a Pave Tack laser designator pod to allow the independent delivery of guided bombs. The demonstrator was displayed at the 1980 Farnborough Airshow.
Look for this particular F-15E Strike Eagle, decked out in a so-called “lizard camouflage” pattern conducive for low-level strike operations, to swoop in later this September.
Forces of Valor’s 1:700 scale Imperial Japanese Navy Yamato Class Super Battleship – Yamato, Operation Kikusui Ichi-Go, Okinawa, 1945 [Waterline Version]
In Greek mythology, Phaethon (the ‘shining one’) was the son of a water nymph, Clymene, and, allegedly, the sun god, Helios. In order to confirm that he really was his father, Helios promised by the river Styx to grant Phaethon any wish. Phaethon asked to drive the sun god’s chariot. According to Ovid’s Metamorphoses, Helios tried to dissuade him, warning his son that not even Jupiter (Zeus), king of the gods, could control the fiercely hot chariot pulled by fire-breathing horses. But Phaeton was adamant in his demands and Helios finally granted him his wish.
When Phaethon stepped into the chariot, the horses, used to the great weight of the sun god, thought it empty. Confused, they reared and Phaeton lost control. The horses, driven wild, scorched the earth, reducing Africa to a desert. Mother Earth, in danger of burning up, appealed in desperation to Zeus for help. In order to preserve her, Zeus struck the chariot with a thunderbolt. (courtesy History Today)
The final sortie of the Japanese super battleship, Yamato, is, in many ways similar to the fate of poor Phaethon. Short on fuel, unaccustomed to dealing with the more-powerful US Navy, and ordered into battle as a last desperate attempt to keep the Allies at bay during the closing stages of the second world war, the crew of the ship knew that not only were they sailing into harm’s way but also on its death ride, the Imperial Japanese Navy no longer the all-powerful behemoth that ruled the western Pacific.
On January 1st, 1945, Yamato, Haruna and Nagato were transferred to the newly reactivated 1st Battleship Division. Yamato left dry dock two days later for Japan’s Inland Sea. This reassignment was brief; the 1st Battleship Division was deactivated once again on February 10th, and Yamato was allotted to the 1st Carrier Division. On 19 March, American carrier aircraft from TG 58.1 attacked Kure Harbour. Although 16 warships were hit, Yamato sustained only minor damage from several near misses and from one bomb that struck her bridge. The intervention of a squadron of Kawanishi N1K1 “Shiden” fighters (named “George” by the Allies) flown by veteran Japanese fighter instructors prevented the raid from doing too much damage to the base and assembled ships,[40][N 4] while Yamato‘s ability to maneuver—albeit slowly—in the Nasami Channel benefited her.
Forces of Valor’s 1:700 scale Imperial Japanese Navy Yamato Class Super Battleship – Yamato, Operation Kikusui Ichi-Go, Okinawa, 1945, Okinawa, 1945 [Full Hull Version]
As the final step before their planned invasion of the Japanese mainland, Allied forces invaded Okinawa on April 1st. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s response was to organize a mission codenamed Operation Ten-Go that would commit much of Japan’s remaining surface strength. Yamato and nine escorts (the cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers) would sail to Okinawa and, in concert with kamikaze and Okinawa-based army units, attack the Allied forces assembled on and around Okinawa. Yamato would then be beached to act as an unsinkable gun emplacement and continue to fight until destroyed. In preparation for the mission, Yamato had taken on a full stock of ammunition on March 29th. According to the Japanese plan, the ships were supposed to take aboard only enough fuel for a one way voyage to Okinawa, but additional fuel amounting to 60% of capacity was issued on the authority of local base commanders. Designated the “Surface Special Attack Force”, the ships left Tokuyama at 15:20 on 6 April.[42][43]
However, the Allies had intercepted and decoded their radio transmissions, learning the particulars of Operation Ten-Go. Further confirmation of Japanese intentions came around 20:00 when the Surface Special Attack Force, navigating the Bungo Strait, was spotted by the American submarines Threadfin and Hackleback. Both reported Yamato‘s position to the main American carrier strike force, but neither could attack because of the speed of the Japanese ships—22 knots (25 mph; 41 km/h)—and their extreme zigzagging.
The Allied forces around Okinawa braced for an assault. Admiral Raymond Spruance ordered six battleships already engaged in shore bombardment in the sector to prepare for surface action against Yamato. These orders were countermanded in favor of strikes from Admiral Marc Mitscher‘s aircraft carriers, but as a contingency the battleships together with 7 cruisers and 21 destroyers were sent to interdict the Japanese force before it could reach the vulnerable transports and landing craft.
amato‘s crew were at general quarters and ready for anti-aircraft action by dawn on April 7th. The first Allied aircraft made contact with the Surface Special Attack Force at 08:23; two flying boats arrived soon thereafter, and for the next five hours, Yamato fired Common Type 3 or Beehive (3 Shiki tsûjôdan) shells at the Allied seaplanes but could not prevent them from shadowing the force. Yamato obtained her first radar contact with aircraft at 10:00; an hour later, American F6F Hellcat fighters appeared overhead to deal with any Japanese aircraft that might appear. None did.
At about 12:30, 280 bomber and torpedo bomber aircraft arrived over the Japanese force. Asashimo, which had fallen out of formation with engine trouble, was caught and sunk by a detachment of aircraft from San Jacinto. The Surface Special Attack Force increased speed to 24 knots (28 mph; 44 km/h), and following standard Japanese anti-aircraft defensive measures, the destroyers began circling Yamato. The first aircraft swooped in to attack at 12:37. Yahagi turned and raced away at 35 knots (40 mph; 65 km/h) in an attempt to draw off some of the attackers; it drew off only an insignificant number.
Yamato was not hit for four minutes, but at 12:41 two bombs obliterated two of her triple 25 mm anti-aircraft mounts and blew a hole in the deck. A third bomb destroyed her radar room and the starboard aft 127 mm mount. At 12:45 a single torpedo struck Yamato far forward on her port side, sending shock waves throughout the ship. At 12:46, another two bombs struck the port side, one slightly ahead of the aft 155 mm centreline turret and the other right on top of the gun. These caused a great deal of damage to the turret and its magazines; only one man survived. Because many of the ship’s crew who did not go down with the vessel were killed by strafing aircraft as they swam in the oily water, the details are uncertain, but authors Garzke and Dulin record that little damage was caused. Shortly afterward, up to three more torpedoes struck Yamato. Two impacts, on the port side near the engine room and on one of the boiler rooms, are confirmed; the third is disputed but is regarded by Garzke and Dulin as probable because it would explain the reported flooding in Yamato‘s auxiliary steering room. The attack ended around 12:47, leaving the battleship listing 5–6° to port; counterflooding—deliberately flooding compartments on the other side of the ship—reduced the list to 1°. One boiler room had been disabled, slightly reducing Yamato‘s top speed, and strafing had incapacitated many of the gun crews who manned Yamato‘s unprotected 25 mm anti-aircraft weapons, sharply curtailing their effectiveness.
The second attack started just before 13:00. In a coordinated strike, dive bombers flew high overhead to begin their runs while torpedo bombers approached from all directions at just above sea level. Overwhelmed by the number of targets, the battleship’s anti-aircraft guns were ineffective, and the Japanese tried desperate measures to break up the attack. Yamato‘s main guns were loaded with Beehive shells fused to explode one second after firing—a mere 1,000 m (3,300 ft) from the ship—but these had little effect. Three or four torpedoes struck the battleship on the port side and one to starboard. Three hits, close together on the port side, are confirmed: one struck a fire room that had already been hit, one impacted a different fire room, and the third hit the hull adjacent to a damaged outboard engine room, increasing the water flow into that space and possibly flooding nearby locations. The fourth hit, unconfirmed, may have struck aft of the third; Garzke and Dulin believe this would explain the rapid flooding reported in that location. This attack left Yamato in a perilous position, listing 15–18° to port. Counterflooding of all remaining starboard void spaces lessened this to 10°, but further correction would have required repairs or flooding the starboard engine and fire rooms. Although the battleship was not yet in danger of sinking, the list meant the main battery was unable to fire, and her speed was limited to 18 knots (33 km/h; 21 mph).
The third and most damaging attack developed at about 13:40. At least four bombs hit the ship’s superstructure and caused heavy casualties among her 25 mm anti-aircraft gun crews. Many near misses drove in her outer plating, compromising her defense against torpedoes. Most serious were four more torpedo impacts. Three exploded on the port side, increasing water flow into the port inner engine room and flooding yet another fire room and the steering gear room. With the auxiliary steering room already under water, the ship lost maneuverability and became stuck in a starboard turn. The fourth torpedo most likely hit the starboard outer engine room, which, along with three other rooms on the starboard side, was being counterflooded to reduce the port list. The torpedo strike accelerated the rate of flooding and trapped many crewmen.
Both versions of Walterson’s 1:700 scale rendition of the super battleship, Yamato, are currently in stock and ready for immediate shipment.
“Ship unmaneuverable. We shall fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer.“
Vice-Admiral Günther Lütjens, onboard battleship Bismarck
Forces of Valor’s 1:700 scale German Kriegsmarine Bismarck Class Battleship – DKM Bismarck, Operation Rheinubung, Battle of the Denmark Strait, May 1941 [Waterline Version]
The heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen sailed at about 21:00 on 18 May 1941 from Gotenhafen (Gdynia, Poland), followed at 2:00 a.m., May 19th, by Bismarck. Both ships proceeded under escort, separately and rendezvoused off Cape Arkona on Rügen Island in the western Baltic, where the destroyers Z23 and Z16 Friedrich Eckoldt joined them. They then proceeded through the Danish Islands into the Kattegat. Entering the Kattegat on May 20th Bismarck and Prinz Eugen sailed north toward the Skagerrak, the strait between Jutland and Southern Norway, where they were sighted by the Swedish aircraft-carrying cruiser Gotland on around 1:00 p.m. Gotland forwarded the sighting in a routine report. Earlier, around noon, a flight of Swedish aircraft also detected the German vessels and likewise reported their sighting.
On May 21st, the Admiralty was alerted by sources in the Swedish government that two large German warships had been seen in the Kattegat. The ships entered the North Sea and took a brief refuge in a Grimstadfjord near Bergen, Norway on May 21st where Prinz Eugen was topped off with fuel, making a break for the Atlantic shipping lanes on May 22nd. By this time, Hood and Prince of Wales, with escorting destroyers, were en route to the Denmark Strait, where two cruisers, Norfolk and Suffolk were already patrolling. The cruisers Manchester and Birmingham had been sent to guard the waters south-east of Iceland.
Forces of Valor’s 1:700 scale German Kriegsmarine Bismarck Class Battleship – DKM Bismarck, Operation Rheinubung, Battle of the Denmark Strait, May 1941 [Full Hull Version]
Once the departure of the German ships was discovered, AdmiralSir John Tovey, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Home Fleet, sailed with King George V, Victorious and their escorts to support those already at sea. Repulse joined soon afterwards.
On the evening of May 23rd, Suffolk sighted Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in the Denmark Strait, close to the Greenland coast. Suffolk immediately sought cover in a fog bank and alerted The Admiralty. Bismarck opened fire on Norfolk at a range of six miles but Norfolk escaped into fog. Norfolk and Suffolk, outgunned, shadowed the German ships using radar. No hits were scored but the concussion of the main guns firing at Norfolk had knocked out Bismarck’s radar causing Lütjens to re-position Prinz Eugen ahead of Bismarck. After the German ships were sighted, British naval groups were redirected to either intercept Lütjens’ force or to cover a troop convoy.
Hood and Prince of Wales made contact with the German force early on the morning of May 24th, and the action started at 5:52 a.m., with the combatants about 25,000 yards (23,000 m) apart. Gunners onboard Hood initially mistook Prinz Eugen that was now in the lead for Bismarck and opened fire on her, Capt Leach commanding HMS Prince of wales realizing V/Adm Holland’s error engaged Bismarck from the outset. Both German ships were firing at Hood. Hood suffered an early hit from Prinz Eugen which started a rapidly spreading fire amidships.
Then, at about 6 a.m., one or more of Hood’s magazines exploded, probably as the result of a direct hit by a 38 cm (15 in) shell from Bismarck. The massive explosion broke the great battlecruiser’s back, and she sank within minutes. All but three of her 1,418-man crew died, including Vice Admiral Lancelot Holland, commanding officer of the squadron.
Prince of Wales continued the action, but suffered multiple hits with 38 cm (15 in) and 20.3 cm (8 in) shells, and experienced repeated mechanical failures with her main armament. Her commanding officer, Captain Leach, was wounded when one of Bismarck’s shells struck Prince of Wales’ bridge. Leach broke off the action, and the British battleship retreated under cover of a smokescreen.
Bismarck had been hit three times but Admiral Lütjens overruled Bismarck‘s Captain Ernst Lindemann who wanted to pursue the damaged Prince of Wales and finish her off. All of the hits on Bismarck had been inflicted by Prince of Wales‘ 14-inch (356 mm) guns. One of the hits had penetrated the German battleship’s hull near the bow, rupturing some of her fuel tanks, causing her to leak oil continuously and at a serious rate. This was to be a critical factor as the pursuit continued, forcing Bismarck to make for Brest instead of escaping into the great expanse of the Atlantic. The resulting oil slick also helped the British cruisers to shadow her.
Norfolk and Suffolk and the damaged Prince of Wales continued to shadow the Germans, reporting their position to draw British forces to the scene. In response, it was decided that the undamaged Prinz Eugen would detach to continue raiding, while Bismarck drew off the pursuit. In conjunction with this, Admiral Dönitz committed the U-boat arm to support Bismarck with all available U-boats in the Atlantic. He organised two patrol lines to trap the Home Fleet should Bismarck lead her pursuers to them. One line of 7 boats was arrayed in mid-Atlantic while another, of 8 boats, was stationed west of the Bay of Biscay. At 6:40 p.m. on 24 May, Bismarck turned on her pursuers and briefly opened fire to cover the escape of Prinz Eugen. The German cruiser slipped away undamaged.
At 10 p.m., Victorious was 120 miles (190 km) away and launched an air attack with nine Fairey Swordfishtorpedo bombers, which were guided in by Norfolk. In poor weather, and against heavy fire, they attacked and made a single torpedo hit under the bridge. However, up against strong belt armor and anti-torpedo bulges, it failed to cause substantial damage. The attacking aircraft were all safely recovered by Victorious, despite poor weather, darkness, aircrew inexperience and the failure of the carrier’s homing beacon.[7]
At 3 a.m. on May 25th, the British shadowers lost contact with Bismarck. At first, it was thought that she would return to the North Sea, and ships were directed accordingly. Then Lütjens, believing that he was still being shadowed by the British, broke radio silence by sending a long radio message to headquarters in Germany. This allowed the British to triangulate Bismarck’s approximate position and send aircraft to hunt for the German battleship. By the time that it was realized that Lütjens was heading for Brest, Bismarck had broken the naval cordon and gained a lead. By 11 p.m., Lütjens was well to the east of Tovey’s force and had managed to evade Rodney. Bismarck was short of fuel due to the damaging hit inflicted by Prince of Wales which had caused Lütjens to reduce speed to conserve fuel but Bismarck still had enough speed to outrun the heavy units of the Home Fleet and reach the safety of France. From the south, however, Somerville’s Force H with the carrier Ark Royal, the battlecruiser Renown, and the light cruiser HMS Sheffield were approaching to intercept.
The British ships were also beginning to run low on fuel, and the escape of Bismarck seemed more and more certain. However, at 10:30 a.m. on 26 May, a PBY Catalina flying-boat, based at Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, found Bismarck. She was 700 miles (1,100 km) from Brest and not within range of Luftwaffe air cover.
This contact was taken over by two Swordfish from Ark Royal. This carrier now launched an airstrike, but her aircrew were unaware of Sheffield’s proximity to Bismarck, mistook the British cruiser for the German battleship and therefore immediately attacked her. Their torpedoes had been fitted with influence detonators, and several of them exploded prematurely. Others missed their target, and the attacking aircraft then received a warning from Ark Royal that Sheffield was in the vicinity, whereupon the Swordfish finally recognized the cruiser and broke off the attack.
Ark Royal now launched, in almost impossibly bad weather conditions for air operations, and from a distance of less than 40 miles upwind of Bismarck, a second strike consisting of 15 Swordfish. These were carrying torpedoes equipped with the standard and reliable contact detonators. The attack resulted in two or three hits on the German ship, one of which inflicted critical damage on her steering. A jammed rudder now meant she could now only sail away from her intended destination of Brest. At midnight, Lütjens signalled his headquarters: “Ship unmaneuverable. We shall fight to the last shell. Long live the Führer.”
The battleships Rodney and King George V waited for daylight on May 27th before attacking. At 8:47 a.m., they opened fire, quickly hitting Bismarck. Her gunners achieved near misses on Rodney, but the British ships had silenced Bismarck’s main guns within half an hour. Despite close-range shelling by Rodney, a list to port, and widespread fires, Bismarck did not sink.
According to David Mearns and James Cameron’s underwater surveys in recent years the British main guns achieved only four hits on Bismarck‘s main armored belt, two through the upper armor belt on the starboard side from King George V and two on the port side from Rodney. These four hits occurred at about 10:00 a.m., at close range, causing heavy casualties among the sheltering crew.
Nearly out of fuel – and mindful of possible U-boat attacks – the British battleships left for home. The heavy cruiser Dorsetshire attacked with torpedoes and made three hits. Scuttling charges were soon set off by German sailors, and at 10:40 a.m., Bismarck capsized and sank. Dorsetshire and the destroyer Maori rescued 110 survivors. After an hour, rescue work was abruptly ended when there were reports of a U-boat presence. Another three survivors were picked up by U-74 and two by the German weather shipSachsenwald. Over 2,000 died, including Captain Lindemann and Admiral Lütjens.
To commemorate the actions of the battleship, DKM Bismarck, Waltersons is both relaunching its full hull version of the warship, while simultaneously releasing a waterline version. Both versions are expected to grace our shelves in late August.
The Republic F-105 Thunderchief was a supersonic fighter-bomber used by the United States Air Force. The Mach 2 capable F-105 bore the brunt of strike bombing over North Vietnam during the early years of the Vietnam War. Originally designed and deployed as a single seat aircraft, a two-seat Wild Weasel version was later developed for use in the specialized Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) role against surface-to-air missile sites. It was commonly known as the Thud by its crews.
As a follow-on to the Mach 1 capable F-100, the F-105 was also armed with missiles and a cannon; however, its design was tailored to high-speed low-altitude penetration carrying a single nuclear bomb internally. First flown in 1955, the Thunderchief entered service in 1958. As the largest single-engined fighter ever employed by the USAF, the single-seat F-105 would be adapted to deliver a greater iron bomb load than the four-engined, 10-man strategic bombers of World War II like the B-17, B-24 and B-29. The F-105 would be best remembered as the primary strike bomber over North Vietnam in the early stages of the Vietnam War. Over 20,000 Thunderchief sorties were flown, with 382 aircraft lost (nearly half of the 833 produced) including 62 operational casualties. Although it lacked the agility of the smaller MiG fighters, USAF F-105s demonstrated the effectiveness of guns, and were credited with downing 27.5 enemy aircraft.
During the war, the two-seat F-105F and F-105G Wild Weasel variants became the first dedicated Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) platforms, fighting against the Soviet-built S-75 Dvina / (SA-2 Guideline) surface-to-air missiles. Two Wild Weasel pilots were awarded the Medal of Honor for attacking North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile sites, with one shooting down two MiG-17s the same day. The dangerous missions often required them to be the “first in, last out,” suppressing enemy air defenses and keeping them suppressed while strike aircraft accomplished their missions and then left the area.
Although the F-105 weighed 50,000 pounds (22,680 kg), the aircraft could exceed the speed of sound at sea level and Mach 2 at high altitude. It could carry up to 14,000 pounds (6,700 kg) of bombs and missiles. The Thunderchief was later replaced as a strike aircraft over North Vietnam by both the F-4 Phantom II and the swing-wing F-111. However, the “Wild Weasel” variants remained in service until 1984, when they were replaced by a specialized F-4G “Wild Weasel V”. The USAF F-4G was subsequently replaced by the USAF F-16CJ Fighting Falcon aircraft, currently employed in the SEAD role.
Hobby Master’s second ever F-105G Thunderchief fighter-bomber, which was attached to the 17th Wild Weasel Squadron “Hooters”, 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, and deployed to Korat RTAB, Thailand, during 1973, and painted in a scintillating southeast Asian camouflage scheme is now in stock and ready for immediate shipment.
Militaria Diecast’s 1:43 scale US Army M16 Multiple Gun Motor Carriage
The M16 Multiple Gun Motor Carriage, also known as the M16 half-track, was an American self-propelled anti-aircraft weapon built during World War II. It was equipped with four .50 caliber (12.7 mm) M2 Browning machine guns in an M45 Quadmount. 2,700 were produced by White Motor Company from May 1943 to March 1944, with 568 M13 MGMCs and 109 T10 half-tracks being converted into M16s as well.
The chassis was derived from the T1E2 chassis, an earlier version of the M13. Based on an M3 half-track chassis, it replaced the M13 MGMC half-track after early 1944. As aircraft became more advanced, the usefulness of the M16 was reduced. In the Korean War, it was relegated primarily to the ground-support role, being put out of service in the U.S. Army in 1954.
Nicknamed the “Meat Chopper”, the M16 was famous for its effectiveness against low-flying aircraft and infantry, making it extremely popular with soldiers. It was used by the United States Army, the British Commonwealth, and South Korea. A similar version of the M16, the M17, was based on the M5 half-track and exported via Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union.
The M16 MGMC entered service in early 1944, with the M13 taken out of action soon after. The M16 was nicknamed “The Meat Chopper” for its deadly firepower, and was extremely popular with troops. In addition to its anti-aircraft role, the M16 was used in an infantry support role, frequently accompanied by the M15 half-track. The M17 MGMC primarily served with the Soviet Union as part of Operation Bagration and a few other battles.
The M16 saw service with U.S. forces in the Italian Campaign, and Operation Overlord, the Battle of Arracourt, and the Ardennes Offensive in northern Europe. Small numbers were supplied to the United Kingdom and France under Lend-Lease. The vehicle was also used widely in the Korean War by the South Korean army, the United States Marine Corps, and the US Army.
As aircraft became more advanced over the M16’s lifetime, its role as a mobile anti-aircraft weapon became limited, and the newer M19 MGMC was more heavily-armed with more powerful and longer-range guns. During the Korean War, it served mainly in the ground-support role, at which it was highly effective. In late 1951, it was declared as “limited standard” and largely taken out of service from the U.S. Army in Korea, although a few examples served until the end of the war. It was declared obsolete by the U.S. Army in 1958.
